I am extremely sympathetic to Ameriks's overall conception of these matters. Nevertheless, I have two worries that I shall raise briefly. The first is a worry that Ameriks himself has, and airs (Chapter 8, § III). If the history of philosophy is such an integral part of philosophy, how can so much great philosophy have been accomplished before its inauguration? One reaction to this worry, obviously, would be to reconsider how integral a part of philosophy the history of philosophy is. But another reaction, equally obviously, would be to reconsider the claim that its inauguration came so late. As far as the latter is concerned, Ameriks's book would have benefited, I think, from some comparison of what he understands by the history of philosophy with what we find in, say, scholastic work on the philosophy of antiquity.

My second worry relates to Ameriks's recoil from historicism. Although Ameriks talks about the need in philosophy to find a new voice and to raise new philosophical questions (Chapter 8, § I), he nevertheless encourages a view of philosophical progress as based on a personal encounter with voices of yore which is not unlike the encounter we have with voices of today with whom we might be in dialogue. But perhaps we should be interested in voices of yore, not so much because they can be heard as voices with whom we might be in some kind of dialogue as because they *cannot* be heard as voices with whom we might be in some kind of dialogue; because they call into question whatever presuppositions make the kind of dialogue in which we engage possible. I am not suggesting that Ameriks is oblivious to this phenomenon. Even so, when he distinguishes four main conceptions of the history of philosophy (the scientistic conception, the historicist conception, the Hegelian conception, and his own), perhaps he is guilty of overlooking a fifth.

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The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory
By RICHARD DEAN
Clarendon Press, 2006. x + 270 pp. £40.00

Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative reads, "So act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (*Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* 429). Unlike other things that possess merely contingent worth, Kant writes, humanity has unconditional value. But this commitment appears to be in tension with Kant's account of the good will as the only unconditional good (*Groundwork* 393). If the good will is the only unconditional good, how can humanity also have unconditional value?

Richard Dean argues for a novel solution to this thorny interpretive puzzle: Humanity, for Kant, just *is* the good will. While the dominant trend in Kant scholarship has been to interpret humanity as some feature(s) possessed by all minimally rational beings, and the good will as something possessed only by certain individuals (those who consistently act from duty), Dean contends instead that the two are identical, and thus that humanity is an ideal to be aspired to, not something we all possess: "The humanity that should be

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treated as an end in itself is a properly ordered will, which gives priority to moral considerations over self-interest. To employ Kant's terminology, the end in itself is a good will" (p. 6). In the book's first half, Dean builds a formidable case that his interpretation best fits with other important themes in Kant's moral theory and is indicated by the texts themselves. In particular, he argues that his good will reading is preferable to three versions of what he calls the 'minimal reading' of humanity: Christine Korsgaard's interpretation of humanity as the capacity to set ends; Allen Wood's view of humanity as principally this end-setting capacity; and Thomas Hill Jr.'s account of humanity as the capacity for morality.

Dean is persuasive in his critique of interpretations of humanity as consisting, either entirely (Korsgaard) or at least centrally (Wood), in the capacity to set ends. For instance, he objects that such a view implies that we must give value even to others' *immoral* ends: "The minimal reading leaves no room for adding that sometimes the power to set ends lacks value, and thus fails to deserve respect. So any time an agent exercises this power and sets an end, we should show respect for her end-setting power by treating her ends as valuable" (p. 50). Dean's argument highlights a general problem for the capacity-to-set-ends reading: It's not clear why this capacity, which might be realized in our setting only inclination-based ends, has unconditional value. Korsgaard's reply is that the capacity to set ends is fully realized in the good will, which is unconditionally good (Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 123–124). But as Dean recognizes, it doesn't follow that a mere capacity to set ends is fully realized *only* when we set the right sort of ends (i.e., ones motivated by duty). If the good will is the full realization of humanity, then humanity seems to entail more than just the substantively neutral capacity to set any ends whatsoever.

On Dean's reading, humanity is a *commitment* to act from moral principles rather than inclinations (i.e., the good will). But it's not clear that such a radical interpretation is called for. One obvious reason for doubt is that, if Kant intends the good will to be that which should always be treated as an end in itself, he has ample opportunity to say so explicitly. Given his substantial account in *Groundwork* I of the good will, why not formulate the Categorical Imperative in these terms, rather than in terms of humanity? The textual distinction itself provides prima facie reason for doubt about identifying humanity with the good will. Such doubt might be outweighed if the good will reading offered substantial benefits over any competing interpretation. But a less radical interpretation is available that improves on the shortcomings Dean rightly notes in the capacity-to-set-ends readings while still rendering humanity and the good will as conceptually distinct—and without implying the further, unpalatable conclusion that some minimally rational people don't possess humanity, and thus don't fall within the scope of the humanity formulation's instruction to be treated as ends in themselves. On this interpretation, humanity is the *predisposition* to respect for the moral law (what Kant in *Religion* calls a predisposition to 'personality'). Unlike the capacity to set ends, this predisposition is not realized in inclination-based as well as duty-based choices; but unlike the good will, the predisposition is possessed by all rational beings (*Religion*

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6:28). Thus this interpretation avoids the potentially worrisome implications of not attributing humanity to all minimally rational individuals.

Dean is sensitive to this last worry; in fact, much of the book's second half aims to explain why those who apparently do not, or cannot, commit to act on moral principles nevertheless deserve respectful treatment. He rightly reminds us of key features of Kant's moral philosophy—his emphasis on the inscrutability of motives and the ever-existent possibility of redemption, for instance—that should mitigate against our willingness too readily to infer the existence of hopelessly evil wills. Less convincing, however, is Dean's moral constructivist argument, drawn from Kant's kingdom of ends, according to which "the moral rules that determine whether any action is right or wrong are exactly those rules that would be agreed upon by hypothetical rational beings deliberating together" (p. 185). Such an account, he contends, would generate prohibitions on the mistreatment of those lacking good wills. But his explanation for *why* rational deliberators would prohibit such mistreatment hinges largely on the contingent psychological fact that deliberators would "care about the treatment of other sentient beings, even if these other beings lack a commitment to morality" (p. 187). Something seems odd, within a Kantian moral system, about grounding respect on subjective features of human psychology.

Ultimately, for the reasons discussed above, I remain dubious of Dean's conclusion identifying humanity with the good will. But I share his scepticism about traditional humanity interpretations and their success in reconciling humanity as an end in itself with the good will as an unconditional good. This book raises powerful objections to those who endorse 'minimal' readings, especially the capacity-to-set-ends view. It is an impressive, important contribution to the growing literature about Kant's views on humanity as an end in itself.

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Kant
By PAUL GUYER
Routledge, 2006. xiv + 440 pp. £12.99 paper

In *Kant* Paul Guyer discusses Kant's three Critiques, explaining their interrelations and roles in the development of Kant's views. This is a daunting goal for a work of 400+ pages, even for one as qualified as Guyer. Is it possible to treat such complex arguments as Kant's transcendental deductions in sufficient detail? Can Guyer curtail his unsympathetic tendencies enough to present a fair overview? Finally, to whom is the book addressed, and how much familiarity with Kant must the reader have? The first two questions have fairly clear answers: Guyer does a remarkable job of making the main ideas clear, although naturally he omits many points required for a solid grasp of the arguments. With some exceptions he also approaches the texts charitably. As expected, he mentions both strengths and weaknesses in the arguments, but the tone gives one confidence in his reading. The book appears most valuable for

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